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INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 1996, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC1 that a
federal statute provision permitting cable television operators to de-
cide whether to allow public access channels to carry programs they
reasonably believe are "patently offensive" violated the First Amend-
ment.2 However, in the same opinion, the Court upheld a similar pro-
1. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality).
2. Id. at 2394-97. The federal statute at issue in Denver Telecommunications Consortium was
the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
Congress has defined cable operator as:
[A]ny person or group of persons (A) who provides cable service over a cable system
and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such cable
system, or (B) who otherwise controls or is responsible for, through any arrangement,
the management and operation of such a cable system.
1042 [Vol. 47:1041
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vision that applied only to leased access channels. 3 The Court also
struck down a third provision that required cable operators to segre-
gate and block any patently offensive programming appearing on
leased access channels and to unblock such programming within thirty
days of a subscriber's written request to do so.4
Part I of this Note summarizes the cable regulations leading up to
Denver Telecommunications Consortium. It also describes the func-
tional and technological similarities and differences between the print,
broadcast, telephone, and cable media, as well as the different ap-
proaches the Court has applied to these media in the face of various
First Amendment challenges. Part II details the appellate court's en
banc opinion, as well as the Supreme Court's plurality, majority, con-
curring, and dissenting opinions in Denver Telecommunications
Consortium.
Part III analyzes the plurality's struggle to formulate an acceptable
analysis to apply to First Amendment issues arising in the cable con-
text, as well as to determine whose rights are paramount-the cable
operator's, the cable programmer's, or the viewer's. Departing from
the intermediate scrutiny test that the Court utilized in previous cable
cases involving First Amendment challenges, the plurality adjudicated
Denver Telecommunications Consortium without reference to a partic-
ular scrutiny level. It manipulated traditional First Amendment ter-
minology, made inconsistent analogies to the broadcast industry, and
left subsequent courts uncertain as to how to apply the abstruse rule
of the case. A significant aspect of the plurality's inability to find a
standard on which to base its analysis stemmed from the fact that
cable technology had changed, and continues to change, at a rapid
rate. 5 Finally, Part IV discusses possible ramifications that this un-
precedented decision will have on future First Amendment cases in
the cable industry as well as in other technologically emerging com-
munication industries.
47 U.S.C. § 522(5) (1994). The Court has defined cable operators as "those who own the physi-
cal cable network and transmit the cable signal to the viewer." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 628 (1994).
3. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2385-87. Leased access channels are aimed at
bringing a wide "diversity of information sources" to cable subscribers. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a).
4. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.




A. Technological Advancements and Government Regulation in the
Cable Industry
1. The Growth of the Cable Industry
Cable television has undergone tremendous growth and change
since its inception in the 1940s. 6 The first cable systems were known
as community antenna television ("CATV") and functioned solely to
retransmit broadcast signals to rural and remote areas. 7 Today, cable
has grown from a "communications weakling" to a $20 billion indus-
try.8 This is evidenced by the fact that CATV systems comprised only
nine percent of the market in 1970, whereas multi-channel cable sys-
tems now have the technological capability to reach over ninety per-
cent of all American households. 9 Now, more than sixty percent of all
households with televisions subscribe to cable, 10 and this figure is pro-
jected to grow beyond seventy percent."
Technological advancements have allowed cable television to oper-
ate through signals which are transmitted from satellites, master an-
tennas, or local television studios to the cable operator and then
retransmitted to the subscriber.' 2 Cable television has the capability
to provide subscribers with over one hundred channels.' 3 There are
numerous "packages" from which a subscriber can choose. "Basic
cable" includes programming from several broadcast stations and lo-
cal affiliates, as well as additional channels like CNN, C-Span, and
A&E.14 There are also "premium" packages which provide program-
ming channels such as The Movie Channel, Playboy Television, and
6. See Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications
Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1459-60 (1996); Wally Mueller, Comment, Controversial
Programming on Cable Television's Public Access Channels: The Limits of Governmental Re-
sponse, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1052-58 (1989).
7. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1460; Mueller, supra note 6, at 1054.
8. Chen, supra note 6, at 1472.
9. Id.
10. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, at 56 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1238), affd in
part & rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
2374 (1996) (plurality). Another case found that approximately 59 million households subscribe
to cable. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 672 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
11. Thmer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1190 (1997) (plurality); see Cable TV
Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 12 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. 259 (1991) (statement
of Edward 0. Fritts, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters).
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ShowTime, to name a few. 15 Also, many cable system operators offer
pay-per-view programming, enabling customers to watch a certain
movie, at a certain time, for a set fee.16
Like any industry that has experienced rapid success, the cable in-
dustry has had its fair share of growing pains. Legislators have strug-
gled to enact regulations that keep pace with the complex and
changing technical issues that cable television poses for the communi-
cations industry and the public at large. The following provides a
brief overview of the legislation affecting the cable industry since its
inception just fifty-eight years ago. This review is necessary for a thor-
ough understanding of the complex issues surrounding Denver Tele-
communications Consortium.
2. The FCC Begins to Regulate
During the 1950s and 1960s, cable television was regulated on a lo-
cal and sometimes a state level, but not on a federal level. 17 The Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") did not regulate cable
initially because it mistakenly viewed cable as a temporary medium
that would fade into the past once local broadcast systems were able
to fill the "coverage vacuum.' 8 Obviously, this belief was mis-
guided.19 As early as the late 1950s, the growth of the cable industry
led the broadcast television industry to encourage the FCC to assert
jurisdiction over the cable industry pursuant to the Communications
Act of 1934.20 Broadcasters lobbied for regulation because they
feared that the physical characteristics of cable, 21 as well as the in-
creasing concentration of power in the cable industry,22 would cut into




17. Mueller, supra note 6, at 1066-67.
18. Id. at 1067. "Coverage vacuum" refers to remote rural areas that were not serviced by
local broadcast stations. Id.
19. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1460 (stating that by the 1960s, cable had become a bona fide
competitor of broadcast television).
20. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 1067.
21. Greater than half of all cable systems in existence have the capability to carry between 30
and 53 channels, and 40% of cable subscribers receive more than 53 channels. Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 628 (1994) (citing figures from 62 TELEVISION AND CABLE
FACTBOOK 1-69 (Albert Warren ed., 1994)). Cable also improves reception of programming by
eliminating the signal interference that often occurs with over-the-air broadcasting. Id.
22. Ninety-nine percent of all communities are serviced by only one cable system. Turner
Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 740 n.10 (D.D.C. 1995).
23. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 633-34. Broadcast stations transmit signals to viewers at no
charge and make money by selling advertising times, whereas cable systems charge viewers a
19981 1045
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In the 1960s, the FCC began regulating the cable industry.2 4 It re-
quired local-origination programming, where practical, as a condition
for the carriage of broadcast signals.2 5 FCC regulations mandated the
cable operator to provide cameras, playback equipment, and studios
for both the production and presentation of local programs.26 In 1976,
the FCC promulgated access requirements forcing cable operators to
provide common-carrier channels for third parties to present their
own programming. 27 These access rules required cable systems with
more than 3,500 subscribers to carry broadcast signals of third par-
ties.28 The FCC believed that these access requirements promoted
"'the achievement of long-standing communications regulatory objec-
tives by increasing outlets for local self-expression and augmenting the
public's choice of programs.' ' '2 9 However, in 1979, the Court ruled
against mandatory access requirements, finding them outside the
FCC's jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934.30
The early 1980s were a difficult time for cable because of public
disillusionment with cable television's potential. 31 Both consumers
and legislators were disgruntled with cable because of unrealistic ex-
monthly fee to receive cable. Id. at 629. Thus, cable does not rely to such a great extent on
selling advertising time to generate revenue. Id; see also Jeff Gray, Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC: The Need for a New Approach in First Amendment Jurisprudence of the Cable
Industry, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 999, 1008-09 (1995) (discussing differences between cable television
and broadcast television).
24. In Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963), broadcast-
ers convinced the court that cable television hindered the FCC's ability to regulate the broadcast
industry according to the public interest standard as required by the 1934 Communications Act.
Id. at 362-63. In 1966, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over all cable television systems. CATV, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, 733-34 (1966).
25. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 1058-59. Local origination programming is originated and
produced by the cable operator. Id. at 1056; see supra note 2 (defining cable operator). It is also
directed, engineered, and controlled by cable operators. Mueller, supra note 6, at 1057. The
cable operator determines the content of the programs and often sells advertising time during
the show. Id. Cablecast on local origination channels includes "community bulletin boards (au-
tomated alphanumeric programming), public service announcements, local sports, public meet-
ings, interview shows, panel discussions on public issues, local news, and call-in shows." Id. at
1058. Viewers often confuse local origination programming with access programming produced
by outside third parties. Id.
26. CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 207 (1969).
27. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 691 (1979).
28. Cable TV Capacity & Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 297 (1976).
29. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 694-95 (quoting Cable TV Capacity, 59 F.C.C.2d at 298).
30. Id. at 708-09. The Court found that access rules imposed common-carrier obligations on
cable operators. Id. at 701. The Court distinguished this case from the origination rules at issue
in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (plurality), because the access re-
quirements in this case took away cable operators' control over the creative composition of their
programming content, whereas the origination rules did not. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 700.
31. Mueller, supra note 6, at 1075.
1998] INDECENT MATERIAL ON CABLE 1047
pectations stemming from franchise agreements, 32 whereby companies
entered bidding contests and made "blue sky promises" to obtain ex-
clusive cable franchises from municipalities. 33 Once granted, the mu-
nicipality usually authorized the franchisee cable company to use
public property for the construction of the physical plant necessary to
operate the cable system, 34 and often local governments demanded
concessions from the winning cable company that were unrelated to
the delivery of cable service.35 This frequently caused cable operators
to miscalculate the costs of maintaining elaborate urban franchises,
overestimate subscriber demand, and make unrealistic estimates of
potential new service.36
3. Congress Begins to Legislate
a. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress first began regulating the cable industry with the
passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("1984
Cable Act"). 37 Cable systems with at least thirty-six channels were
required to set aside between ten and fifteen percent of their activated
channels for commercial use by third parties unaffiliated with the
cable operator ("leased access channels"). 38 In addition, cable
32. Id. A franchise agreement is a contract between the municipality and the cable operator.
Id. It allocates some channels to the full discretion of the cable operator, while reserving others
for public access. Id. The franchise often specifies the nature of the cable system to be built, the
service to be provided, and the rate to be charged. H. REP. No. 98-934, at 19 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4656.
33. Mueller, supra note 6, at 1075-76.
34. Id. at 1075.
35. Id. at 1075-76. The companies' concessions included payment of millions of dollars in
front money to plant trees, computerization of the local library's card catalog, free service to
handicapped residents, and repair of sewage systems. Id. at 1076; see Stephen R. Ross & Barrett
L. Brick, The Cable Act of 1984-How Did We Get There and Where Are We Going?, 39 FED.
COMM. L.J. 27, 34 (1987).
36. Mueller, supra note 6, at 1076.
37. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)); Mueller, supra note 6, at 1074. For an over-
view of the 1984 Cable Act, see Adam R. Spilka, Note, An Excess of Access: The Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act of 1984 and First Amendment Protection of Editorial Discretion, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV. 317, 326-30 (1986).
38. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 612(b), 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (1994); see H.R.
REP. No. 98-934, at 31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4668 (stating that leased
access channels are "fundamental to the goal of providing subscribers with the diversity of infor-
mation sources intended by the First Amendment"). But see William E. Lee, Cable Leased Ac-
cess and the Conflict Among First Amendment Rights and First Amendment Values, 35 EMORY
L.J. 563, 568-76 (1986) (finding that the House Committee on Energy and Commerce's state-
ment regarding diversity was supported only by Supreme Court dicta).
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franchising authorities39 were given authority to require cable opera-
tors to set aside certain channels for public, educational, and govern-
mental access ("PEG access channels"). 40 The House Report.
described these channels as "the video equivalent of the speaker's
soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet. '41
Cable operators were allowed only minimal editorial control over
the access channels. 42 Cable operators could only exclude obscene
programming, not indecent programming. 43 Cable operators, how-
39. A franchising authority is "any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local
law to grant a franchise." 47 U.S.C. § 522(10).
40. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531. Cable operators tradi-
tionally opposed the public access concept because it costs them money. Mueller, supra note 6,
at 1092; see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Access channels force the cable operator
to reduce the number of channels that they can sell to paying program vendors. Id. at 1093.
Access channels also cost cable operators advertising revenues from their local origination pro-
grams and steal potential local-origination subscription bases. Id.
41. H. REP. No. 98-934, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4667.
42. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 §§ 611(e), 612(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e),
532(c)(2).
Access channels are comprised of leased, public, educational, and governmental channels.
Mueller, supra note 6, at 1059. Access channels do not include local origination programming,
even though access programming and local origination programming often appear on the same
channel. Id. at 1057-58.
Public access channels are those "set aside by the cable operator for exclusive use by local
individuals and community groups." Id. at 1060 (quoting Bob Ronka, Cable TV: Preserving
Public Access, 4 L.A. LAW. 8, 9 (1981)); see Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2408-09 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (describing the
variety of public functions of such channels).
Educational access channels are community channels that attempt to educate subscribers and
citizens of all ages. Id.; Mueller, supra note 6, at 1066.
Finally, government access channels are those that are used and controlled by the local munic-
ipalities. Id. These channels allow local officials to effectively reach their constituents and be
accessible to their voters. Id.; see Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2408-09 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring and dissenting). Programming includes explanations of city budgets, codes
and ordinances, as well as consumer information spots, and candidate debates. Mueller, supra
note 6, at 1065.
43. Franchising authorities, by contrast, had the power to exclude any programming which,
"in the judgment of the franchising authority is obscene, or is in conflict with community stan-
dards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, or is otherwise unprotected by the Consti-
tution of the United States." Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 612(h), 47 U.S.C.
§ 532(h).
Congress can regulate obscene material without hesitation since it is not protected by the First
Amendment. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957). A body of work is obscene if it depicts or describes sexual conduct that,
when taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973). It must also portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner without having any
"serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id.
On the other hand, programming that is indecent is deserving of some First Amendment pro-
tection. Indecent programming is defined as any material that "describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary com-
munity standards." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h); Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2404 (Ken-
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ever, could consider the content of the programming to the extent
necessary to establish reasonable prices for the leased access chan-
nels.4 4 Cable viewers could only control their own viewing prefer-
ences by buying or leasing lockboxes from cable operators.45 Due to
their lack of editorial control, cable operators were immunized against
prosecution under federal, state, and local obscenity laws for any inde-
cent or offensive programming carried on access channels.46
b. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992
In 1992, Congress revisited the question of indecent cable program-
ming on leased and PEG access channels. Senator Jesse Helms, sup-
ported by Senator Strom Thurmond, was the main proponent behind
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 ("1992 Cable Act") 47 which amended the 1984 Cable Act.4 8 Ac-
cording to Senator Helms, the problem with the 1984 Cable Act was
"that cable companies are required by law to carry, on leased access
channels, any and every program that comes along-no matter how
nedy, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105,
112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (making distinction between indecent and obscene material
based on First Amendment principles), affd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality).
44. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 612(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2). Congress
recently amended this section's language, giving cable operators more editorial control. It now
reads:
A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any video programming
... except that a cable operator may refuse to transmit any leased access program or
portion of a leased access program which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity and
may consider such content to the minimum extent necessary to establish a reasonable
price for the commercial use of designated channel capacity by an unaffiliated person.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 506(a), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 137 (1996) (codified
at 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(c)(2) (West Supp. 1997)).
45. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2).
A lockbox is "a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable
service during periods selected by that subscriber." Id. Lockboxes operate through the use of a
parental key or a personal identification number. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 813, 818 (D. Del. 1996).
46. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
47. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
(1994)).
48. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, at 80 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1231, 1262.
Congress has amended the 1992 Cable Act with the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The amendments
arguably have no constitutional effect on § 10 of the 1992 Cable Act. See Respondent's Supple-
mental Brief, at *1-*4, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(1996) (plurality) (Nos. 95-124, 95-227), 1996 WL 56498. Therefore, this Note does not discuss
the changes made by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in detail.
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offensive and disgusting. ' 49 Senator Helms stated that there were nu-
merous programs on access channels that depicted women and men
stripping completely nude, showed oral sex, as well as allowed adver-
tising that promoted incest, bestiality, and rape.50 In addition, Senator
Coats stressed that "early and sustained exposure" to such materials
would cause "significant physical, psychological and social damage to
a child."''S
Members of Congress shared Senator Helms's and Senator Coats's
convictions as evidenced by the fact that the 1992 Cable Act was ap-
proved unanimously by the Senate 52 and was unopposed by the House
in conference.5 3 The 1992 Cable Act was an attempt to balance the
conflicting First Amendment rights of cable operators, cable program-
mers, and viewers, with the need to enact safeguards to protect chil-
dren from indecent programming on leased and PEG access
channels.5 4 Under the 1984 Cable Act, the only regulation which pre-
vented children from exposure to indecent materials was whatever
voluntary self-regulation a parental subscriber put in place. 55 In con-
trast, § 10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act permitted cable operators to en-
force a written, published policy prohibiting programming on leased
access channels that the cable operator believed described or depicted
"sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive man-
ner as measured by contemporary community standards. ' 56 This pro-
vision gave cable operators the right to reject indecent material,
however, § 10(a) did not require the cable operator to do so. 57
In order to limit children's access to indecent programming, Con-
gress also enacted § 10(b). This provision directed the FCC to pre-
scribe rules requiring cable operators who chose to carry indecent
programming on leased access channels to place such programming on
a separate channel and to block the channel until the subscriber re-
49. 138 CONG. REC. 985 (1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 988 (statement of Sen. Coats).
52. Id.
53. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 102-862, at 80.
54. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, §§ 2, 10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-63, 1486 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C. (1994)).
See supra note 2 (defining cable operator). Cable programmers are those who produce televi-
sion programs and then license or sell these programs to cable operators. See Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994).
55. See supra text accompanying note 45.
56. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 10(a), 47 U.S.C.
§ 532(h) (1994).
57. See 138 CONG. REC. 985 (1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
1050 [Vol. 47:1041
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quested unblocking in writing.58 Congress also enacted § 10(c) which
required the FCC to promulgate regulations necessary to enable cable
operators to prohibit the use of PEG access channels for "any pro-
gramming which contains obscene material, sexually explicit conduct,
or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct. ' 59 Finally, Con-
gress enacted § 10(d) which eliminated cable operators' immunity
58. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 10(b), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 5320) (1994)). In response, the FCC
promulgated the following regulation:
Leased access channels.
(a) Notwithstanding 47 U.S.C. 532(b)(2) (Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
§ 612), a cable operator, in accordance with 47 U.S.C. 532(h) (Cable Consumer Protec-
tion and Competition Act of 1992, § 10(a)), may adopt and enforce prospectively a
written and published policy of prohibiting programming which, it reasonably believes,
describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive man-
ner as measured by contemporary community standards.
(b) A cable operator that does not prohibit the distribution of programming in ac-
cordance with paragraph (a) of this section shall place any leased access programming
identified by program providers as indecent on one or more channels that are available
to subscribers only with their prior written consent as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section.
(c) A cable operator shall make such programming available to a subscriber within
30 days of receipt of a written request for access to the programming that includes a
statement that the requesting subscriber is at least eighteen years old; a cable operator
shall terminate a subscriber's access to such programming within 30 days from receipt
of a subscriber's request.
(d) A program provider requesting access to a leased access channel shall identify
for a cable operator any programming that is indecent as defined in paragraph (g) of
this section. Such identification shall be in writing and include the full name, address,
and telephone number of the program provider and a statement that the program pro-
vider is responsible for the content of the programming. A cable operator may require
that such identification be provided up to 30 days to the requested date for carriage. A
program provider requesting carriage of "live programming" on a leased access channel
that is not identified as indecent must exercise reasonable efforts to insure that indecent
programming will not be presented. A cable operator will not be in violation of para-
graph (b) of this section if it fails to block indecent programming that is not identified
by a program provider as required in paragraph (d) of this section.
47 C.F.R. § 76.701(a)-(d) (1995); see Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505(a) for a similar
blocking provision regarding "channels primarily dedicated to sexually-orientated program-
ming." Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561). In Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1309
(1997), the district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of this
provision, finding that Playboy was not likely to succeed on its constitutional claims. Id. at 782-
92.
59. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No 102-385,
§ 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486; see 47 U.S.C. note § 531 (1994). Congress has now codified § 10(c)
as follows: "A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any public, educa-
tional, or governmental use of channel capacity provided pursuant to this section, except a cable
operator may refuse to transmit any public access program or portion of a public access program
which contains obscenity, indecency, or nudity." Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 506(a), 47
U.S.C.A. § 531(e) (West Supp. 1997).
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from criminal and civil liability for obscene programming shown on
access channels. 60
B. Judicial Review Differs According to the Medium of
Communication
Given that cable television is a relatively recent phenomena and
that it poses unique First Amendment challenges, the Court draws
from various First Amendment cases in the print, telephone, and
broadcast media when it analyzes issues affecting the cable industry.
Depending on the medium used, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have applied different levels of scrutiny, different means of analysis,
and different interpretations of common and statutory law. Tradition-
ally, the print and telephone media have been analyzed under a strict
scrutiny analysis, thereby receiving the most First Amendment protec-
tion.61 The broadcast medium, under the spectrum scarcity rationale,
has received the least First Amendment protection.62 The cable me-
dium has received mid-range protection, as it is judged under interme-
diate scrutiny. 63
1. Print Cases Analyzed Under Strict Scrutiny
The Court has applied strict scrutiny analysis to the print medium
reasoning that newspaper owners' First Amendment rights are para-
mount to readers', writers', and advertisers' rights.64 Under strict
scrutiny, when a state imposes a regulation on a private entity, it must
have a compelling interest for the regulation, and the regulation must
be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 65 If a regulation fails this
two-prong test, it is unconstitutional. 66
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,67 the Court invalidated
a Florida statute requiring newspapers to provide political candidates
with free space to reply to any newspaper articles assailing their per-
sonal character.68 Implicitly applying a strict scrutiny analysis,69 the
Court reasoned that any government compulsion impacting what
60. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 10(d), 106 Stat.
1460, 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1994)).
61. See infra Part I.B.1.
62. See infra Part I.B.2.
63. See infra Part I.B.3.
64. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974).
65. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216-17, 237 (1995); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
66. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (plurality).
67. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
68. Id. at 244-45.
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newspapers publish is unconstitutional. 70 The Court stated that "the
power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic views was bound by only two factors: first, the
acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertis-
ers-to assure financial success; and second, the journalistic integrity
of its editors and publishers. ' 71 The Court rejected Tornillo's argu-
ment that the government has an obligation to ensure that a wide
range of views reach the public.72 The Court also rejected Tornillo's
argument that newspapers, having consolidated in number and grown
into big businesses, are enormously powerful and influential and are
therefore deserving of some governmental regulation.73
In the Tornillo decision, the Court distinguished the print medium
from the broadcast medium by explaining that newspapers are not
subject to the finite technological limitations of space and time that
confront broadcasters. 74 There are no insurmountable expenses or
technological impediments inhibiting people from starting their own
publications to express the views that another publication chooses not
to publish.75 The Court concluded: "The choice of material to go into
a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public offi-
cials-whether fair or unfair-constitutes the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. '76 In addition, the Court reasoned that from
an economic standpoint, a single newspaper cannot allow infinite ex-
pansion of its column space to accommodate the replies mandated by
the Florida statute.77
Relying on the decision in Tornillo, the Court held in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission78 that the First Amend-
ment was violated when the government required a private party to
disseminate the views of those with whom the party disagreed.79 Ap-
69. See id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). The Court stated that the First Amendment con-
structs "a virtually insurmountable barrier" on any governmental attempts to tamper with free-
dom of the press. Id.
70. Id. at 258.
71. Id. at 255 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973) (plurality)).
72. Id. at 247-48.
73. Id. at 248-50.
74. Id. at 256-57.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 258.
77. Id. at 256-57. "A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, com-
ment, and advertising." Id. at 258.
78. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality).
79. Id. at 20. The Public Utilities Commission compelled the Pacific Gas & Electric Company
to place a newsletter containing views of a third party in its billing envelopes. Id. at 5-6. The
1998] 1053
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
plying strict scrutiny, the plurality reasoned that third persons should
not be given the right to insert their own messages into a private util-
ity's bills over the utility's objections. 80 According to the Court, such
a right would force the utility to choose between appearing to agree or
responding negatively.81 This is contrary to the principle that the
"choice to speak carries with it the choice of what not to say."' 82
2. Telephone Cases Analyzed Under Strict Scrutiny
The Court typically has applied strict scrutiny when analyzing tele-
phone cases involving common carriers. 83 In Sable Communications,
Inc. v. FCC,84 the Court held that banning access to telephone
messages that were indecent, but not obscene, far exceeded what was
necessary to limit minors' access to such messages and was unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment. 85 Using strict scrutiny, the Court
reasoned that prohibiting dial-a-porn services was not a narrowly tai-
lored effort to serve the compelling interest of protecting minors from
exposure to indecent telephone messages.8 6 The Court distinguished
this case from the time, place, and manner restriction in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation87 because Sable involved a complete ban on
speech. 88 Furthermore, the Court differentiated Sable from Pacifica
because dial-a-porn service required the listener to take affirmative
steps to receive the indecent phone messages, whereas indecent
broadcasting intrudes on the privacy of the home without prior warn-
ing as to the content of the materials. 89
Court held that this penalized the expression of particular points of view by the utility and forced
the utility to alter its speech "to conform with an agenda which it did not set." Id. at 34. These
impermissible effects on the utility's First Amendment rights were not remedied by the fact that
it was determined by the Commission that it was the ratepayers, not the utility, which owned the
extra space in the billing envelope. Id. at 17-19.
80. Id. at 19-21. The plurality conceded that the State's interest in fair and effective utility
regulation may be compelling, however they could find "'no substantially relevant correlation
between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to compel appellant to dis-
tribute [appellee's] speech in [the utility company's billing] envelopes." Id. at 19 (citations
omitted).
81. Id. at 15.
82. Id. at 11.
83. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). A common carrier
is any carrier that the law requires to convey passengers or property without refusal if the ap-
proved fare or charge is paid. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 275 (6th ed. 1990).
84. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
85. Id. at 131.
86. Id.
87. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality); see infra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
88. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
89. Id. at 127-28.
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Two years later in Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC,90 the
Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to state regulation of the tele-
phone industry.91 Unlike the complete ban in Sable, the court held
that reverse blocking was a technically feasible and an effective way of
limiting minors' access to dial-a-porn services.92 The court stated that
the provisions for dial-a-porn access are in effect "no different from
requesting access to a periodical subscription, requesting admittance
at a box office to an adult movie, or requesting a copy of an adult
magazine kept under the counter in a plain brown wrapper at the con-
venience store. ' 93 The court reasoned that there was no "prior re-
straint" of speech in requiring users of dial-a-porn to make advance
requests for access, or in requiring providers to notify telephone carri-
ers that their material is sexually oriented. 94 The court also reasoned
that telephone companies are private companies, not state actors, and
thus are not obligated to restrict, terminate, or continue the services of
specific subscribers. 95 Constitutionally, a telephone company can ter-
minate all service to dial-a-porn providers. 96
Similarly, in Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh,97 the
Second Circuit upheld a statute which provided a safe harbor defense
for dial-a-porn service providers if they complied with written tele-
phone company pre-subscription procedures or engaged in independ-
ent billing and collection procedures. 98 According to the court:
[A] child may have suffered serious psychological damage from con-
tact with dial-a-porn before the child's parents may become aware
from a monthly telephone bill that there has been access to an inde-
cent message. Common sense dictates that a presubscription [sic]
requirement, like requirements for payment by credit card before a
message is transmitted, for use of an authorized access or identifica-
tion card before transmission, and for a descrambling device for
90. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 878.
92. Id. at 869, 879. Reverse blocking requires that a subscriber write in to request dial-a-porn
service ("opt-in"), whereas voluntary blocking requires that a person write in to request that
their residence not receive access to dial-a-porn ("opt out"). Id. at 869.
93. Id. at 878.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 877.
96. Id.
97. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d. Cir. 1991).
98. Id. at 1539-44.
A common carrier.., shall not, to the extent technically feasible, provide access to a
[dial-a-porn message] from the telephone of any subscriber who has not previously
requested in writing the carrier to provide access to such communication if the carrier
collects from subscribers an identifiable charge ... that the carrier remits, in whole or
in part, to the provider ....
Id. at 1539 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1990)).
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scrambled messages, is more likely to achieve the goal sought than
blocking after one or more occasions of access. It always is more
effective to lock the barn before the horse is stolen. 99
Even though voluntary blocking alternatives were less economically
restrictive on providers, voluntary blocking was less effective in meet-
ing the goal of shielding minors from indecent communications. 100
The means of a restriction must meet the goal that the legislation is
trying to achieve.1°1
3. Broadcast Cases Analyzed Under Spectrum Scarcity Rationale
and Strict Scrutiny
The broadcast industry has typically received less First Amendment
protection than either the print or the telephone medium. The Court
has applied the fairness doctrine102 to the broadcast medium, reason-
ing that a lower level of scrutiny is justified because of spectrum scar-
city.'0 3 Under this rationale, the Court has reasoned that the rights of
viewers and listeners are paramount to the rights of broadcasters. 10 4
For example, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,10 5 the Court faced
a fact pattern similar to that in Tornillo,10 6 but held that the fairness
doctrine was constitutional as applied to the broadcast medium.'0 7
The Court held that it was constitutional to require radio stations to
furnish persons attacked on the air with a tape, a transcript, or a sum-
mary of the broadcast, as well as to provide the person equal time to
respond, free of charge. 10 8 The Court reasoned:
[T]he reach of radio signals is incomparably greater than the range
of the human voice and the problem of interference is a massive
reality. The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many from
99. Id. at 1542 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1541; accord Information Providers' Coalition, 928 F.2d at 879.
102. The fairness doctrine not only requires broadcasters to cover public issues, but it also
requires them to do so fairly by presenting both sides of the debate. Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969); see generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The
Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J.
151, 154-57 (discussing the administrative and legislative burial of the fairness doctrine).
103. The spectrum scarcity rationale is based on the premise that there are more would-be
broadcasters than there are frequencies available in the electromagnetic spectrums. Thrner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994). "[B]roadcast frequencies constitute a
scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government to avoid
chaos and promote a fairness interest." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376.
104. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
105. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
107. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 371-75; see also Lee, supra note 38, at 571-76 (finding that Red
Lion is a very limited decision).
108. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
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the air, but only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelli-
gence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelli-
gible communication is to be had, even if the radio spectrum is
utilized in the present state of commercially acceptable
technology.10 9
The Court justified its holding by declaring broadcast frequencies
were a scarce resource which could only be fairly regulated and ra-
tioned by the government." 0
In contrast, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee"' the Court reasoned that the rights of the public
are not paramount to the rights of broadcasters.' 2 In that case, the
Court held that neither the public interest nor the fairness doctrine
required broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements." 3 The
Court reasoned that Congress had consistently rejected efforts to im-
pose rights of access for all persons wishing to speak out on public
issues." 4 The Court stated that "it would be anomalous for us to hold,
in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expres-
sion that the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are
subject to the kind of restraints urged by respondents." 15 The Court
reasoned that journalistic tradition and experience trumps individual
private whims to have specific items advertised or covered by the
media.116
Similarly, in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,"7 the Court held that
the fairness doctrine did not require the FCC to impede on broadcast-
ers' editorial discretion." 8 In that case, the Court upheld an FCC pol-
icy of not reviewing past or anticipated changes in a station's
entertainment programming when ruling on the station's license appli-
cation for renewal or transfer." 9 The Court held that this policy did
not conflict with the First Amendment rights of listeners "to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences. 1 120 Rather, the Court stated that the policy "enhanced
109. Id. at 387-88.
110. Id. at 376. The Court felt that if the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to private
parties, chaos would result because of the "cacophony of competing voices, none of which could
be clearly and predictably heard." Id.
111. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
112. Id. at 124.
113. Columbia Broad., 412 U.S. at 124-25.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 120.
116. Id. at 125.
117. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
118. Id. at 600.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 604.
10571998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
First Amendment values by promoting 'the presentation of vigorous
debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the pub-
lic.'""21 The Court reasoned that the FCC's policy furthered the pub-
lic interest by allowing market forces to promote diversity in radio
programming. 122
While the Court employed the fairness doctrine and spectrum scar-
city rationale in Red Lion and the fairness doctrine in Columbia
Broadcasting and WNCN, the Court adjudicated FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation123 without mentioning either doctrine or a particular level
of scrutiny. 124 In Pacifica, a plurality of the Court upheld an FCC ban
on radio broadcasts of indecent material during certain periods. 25
The Court concluded that a twelve-minute monologue by George Car-
lin entitled "Filthy Words" was patently offensive, though not neces-
sarily obscene. 26 The plurality found that the monologue should only
be broadcast at times of the day or evening when children were less
likely to be in the listening audience. 127
In justifying its ban, the plurality focused on four innate characteris-
tics of the broadcast medium and their relationship to children. 12 8
First, the broadcast medium maintains a "uniquely pervasive presence
in the lives of all Americans."'1 29 Second, "[platently offensive, inde-
cent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen ... in
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.' 30
Third, "because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and
out, prior warning cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content.' 131 Fourth, once a child has
121. Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
122. Id.
123. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality).
124. Id.
125. Indecency is defined as "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58
F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
126. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744-51.
127. Id. at 749-50. "[T]he concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes [or depicts] ... sexual or excretory activities and organs, at
times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Citizens
Complaint Against Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975); see generally Jay A. Gayoso, Com-
ment, The FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened Approach for Removing Im-
morality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871, 876-95 (1988) (discussing First
Amendment treatment of indecency in various communication media).
128. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
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turned on the radio and has heard an indecent broadcast, the damage
has been done and is possibly irreparable. 132 Thus, without referring
to a traditional First Amendment scrutiny level, the plurality used a
combination of the children's exposure to indecency and the pervasive
nature of radio to severely limit broadcasters' First Amendment
protection.133
In contrast to Pacifica, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit used strict scrutiny to adjudicate a regulation which
applied to broadcast television in Action For Children's Television v.
FCC.134 In that case, the court upheld the constitutionality of § 16(a)
of the 1992 Cable Act which bans indecent material from being shown
on broadcast television between 6:00 a.m. and midnight. 135 Using a
strict scrutiny analysis and considering the "unique context of the
broadcast medium,' 36 the court found that the complementary inter-
ests of protecting the well-being of children and supporting parental
supervision of children were compelling. 137 The court also found that
channeling indecent broadcasts between the hours of midnight and
6:00 a.m. was narrowly tailored and did not unduly burden First
Amendment rights. 138 The court reasoned that the ban was not overly
restrictive because it did not prevent parents who may want to expose
their children to indecent materials from doing so by using pay-per-
view cable channels, as well as video and audio tapes.139 Additionally,
the court stated that this programming ban was manifestly different
from one which could occur on cable television because cable sub-
scribers affirmatively elect to pay for cable service, whereas broadcast
television viewers do not.140
132. Id. at 748-50.
To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears inde-
cent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the
caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
Id. at 748-49. The plurality further reasoned that the time regulation in Pacifica, which limited
the broadcast to times when kids were not around, is justified because "broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read." Id. at 749-50.
133. Id. at 748-51.
134. 58 F.3d 654, 660-67 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (plurality), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
135. Id. at 656. Stations that go off the air before midnight may begin to air the otherwise
objectionable programming at 10:00 p.m. Id.
136. Id. at 660.
137. Id. at 660-61, 663.
138. Id. at 667.
139. Id. at 663.
140. Id. at 660.
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4. Cable Cases Analyzed Under Intermediate Scrutiny
In contrast to the strict scrutiny analysis the Supreme Court used in
print and telephone media decisions and the spectrum scarcity ration-
ale used in broadcast medium decisions, the Court used intermediate
scrutiny to adjudicate Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC.'4' In
that case, the Court held that the must-carry provisions of the 1992
Cable Act, which required cable television systems to devote a portion
of their channels to transmission of local and public broadcast sta-
tions,142 were content-neutral restrictions that incidentally burdened
speech and, thus, were subject to intermediate scrutiny.143
To withstand a constitutional challenge, intermediate scrutiny re-
quires a content-neutral regulation to satisfy three criteria: (1) the reg-
ulation must further an important or substantial government interest;
(2) it must be unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) it must
be no greater than necessary to further that interest. 144 Applying this
test, the Court found that the must-carry regulations were sufficiently
tailored to serve the important governmental interests of preserving
the benefits of free broadcast television, "promoting the widespread
dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources," and pro-
moting fair competition in television. 45 The Court then remanded
the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia, finding that
material issues of fact existed as to whether there were less restrictive
means to achieve the aforementioned government interests.146
In applying the more exacting scrutiny used in Turner Broadcasting,
rather than the relaxed tests used in Red Lion, Columbia Broadcast-
ing, and WNCN, the Court focused on the innate differences between
broadcast television and cable television147 and the content-neutral
141. 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994). Under intermediate scrutiny, a regulation will be upheld if it
is substantially related to the achievement of an important government interest. United States v.
Virginia Military Inst., 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
142. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 §§ 4(a), 5(a), 47
U.S.C. §§ 534(a), 535(a) (1994). Section 4(a) requires a cable operator to carry "local commer-
cial" television station signals. Id. § 4(a), 47 U.S.C. § 534(a). Section 5(a) requires a cable oper-
ator to carry local public broadcast stations, for example, "noncommercial educational television
stations." Id. § 5(a), 47 U.S.C. § 535(a).
143. Turner Broad., 512 U.S at 662.
144. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
145. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 28, 63 (1992) (discuss-
ing the purpose of the regulations and substantial governmental interests served); S. REP. No.
102-92, at 58-59 (1991) (concluding that the substantial nature of the three government interests
upon which regulations are based "cannot be seriously questioned").
146. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 664-69.
147. Id. at 627-28. Broadcast and cable television use different technologies to reach viewers.
Id. at 627. Broadcast radiates electromagnetic signals from a central transmitting antenna and
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nature of the must-carry regulations.1 48  The Court reasoned that
cable television does not suffer from the inherent programming limita-
tions of broadcast television, given cable's rapid advances in fiber op-
tics and digital compression technology. 149 It stated that "there may
be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the
cable medium." 150 The Court found that the must-carry regulations
were content neutral because they distinguish between speakers in the
television programming market based only upon the manner in which
programmers transmit messages to viewers. 151 According to the
Court, must-carry regulations do not discriminate between the content
of the messages of cable operators and broadcasters. 152
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also used
intermediate scrutiny to adjudicate a freedom of speech issue in the
cable context in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC.153 In that
case, the court found that the leased and PEG access provisions of the
1984 Cable Act did not violate the First Amendment under an inter-
mediate scrutiny test.' 54 The court reasoned that these provisions
passed constitutional muster because "'promoting widespread dissem-
ination of information from a multiplicity of sources' and 'promoting
these signals have the capability of being captured by all televisions within the antenna's range.
Id. In contrast, cable uses physical, point-to-point connections between a transmission facility
and an individual subscriber's television set. Id. at 627-28. Cable's connection to individual tele-
vision sets is similar to telephone companies' use of cable or optical fibers strung above ground
or buried in ducts to reach individual subscribers' telephones. Id. at 628; see also J. GOODALE,
ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION § 5.05[2]
(1988).
148. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 643-52. Content-neutral regulations do not distinguish be-
tween speakers based on the content of their speech. Id. at 643. Rather, content-neutral regula-
tions distinguish between speakers based on the manner in which the speech is disseminated to
the listener or viewer. Id. at 645. Content-based regulations are those which the government
implements because of its agreement or disagreement with a message. Id. at 642 (citing Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
149. Id. at 638-39.
150. Id. at 639; see also Turner Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1995) (dis-
cussing an expert's prediction that digital compression technology will "fuel the expansion of
channel capacity"). The National Cable Television Association ("NCTA") reported that the de-
velopment of fiber optic cable allows the existing coaxial cable to enable every home to carry
100-200 channels. Id. at 745. The Association further reported that the twenty largest multiple
system operators already had begun installation of fiber within their systems, with the amount of
fiber installed by these companies increasing 400% percent since 1988. Id. The association
predicts that "consumers who today can choose from dozens of cable channels soon will have a
video menu of well over 100 options." Id. (citations omitted).
151. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 645-46. The must-carry regulations are content neutral in
application and do not force cable operators to alter their own messages to respond to the
broadcast programming that they must carry. Id. at 645-47.
152. Id. at 645-46.
153. 93 F.3d 957, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
154. Id. at 969-71.
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fair competition in the market for television programming' were im-
portant governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of
speech. 155 The court refused to apply strict scrutiny because it viewed
the leased and PEG access provisions of the 1984 Cable Act as con-
tent-neutral regulations that did not compel speakers to distribute
speech bearing a particular message.156 The dissent argued that leased
and PEG access regulations are content based and favored the con-
tent of a cable programmer's speech over that of a cable operator. t 57
Although the Supreme Court formulated the rule that intermediate
scrutiny would be used in adjudicating First Amendment issues arising
in the cable medium, and lower courts adhered to this rule, it was
short-lived. In Denver Telecommunications Consortium, the Supreme
Court departed from intermediate scrutiny and applied a nontradi-
tional, uncertain, case-by-case analysis in adjudicating a free-speech
issue in the cable medium.
II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. The Appellate Court's En Banc Opinion-§§ 10(a), 10(b), and
10(c) Held Constitutional
In Alliance for Community Media v. FCC,158 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit heard this case en banc and held
that §§ 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act were constitu-
tional under the First Amendment. 159 The full court held that the
rights of cable operators to prohibit indecent programming on leased
or PEG access channels under §§ 10(a) and 10(c) did not constitute
state action to which the First Amendment applied.1 60 The court
stated that the statute did not command cable operators to prohibit
155. Id. at 969 (quoting Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662).
156. Id. at 971-73.
157. Id. at 983-85.
158. 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub norn. Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality). Petitioners, a
number of cable programmers and organizations of listeners and viewers, filed petitions for re-
view in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit regarding the Commission's
regulations implementing the statutory provisions of § 10. Id. at 110. They stated that the imple-
menting provisions violated their rights to free speech under the First Amendment. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated §§ 10(a) and 10(c) stating that
the provisions were attributable to the federal government as "state action." Id. The court re-
manded the issue of the constitutionality of § 10(b)'s segregation and blocking scheme for leased
access channels to the FCC for further consideration in light of its invalidation of §§ 10(a) and
10(c). Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the earlier opinion
on February 16, 1994 and reheard the case en banc. Id.
159. Id. at 123, 129.
160. Id. at 116.
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indecent programming.161 Instead, the court explained that the stat-
ute gave cable operators a choice. 162 They could either carry indecent
programs on their access channels or they could not.163 The choice
was theirs to make-not the government's. 164 The court also con-
cluded that the statute did not significantly encourage a cable opera-
tor to ban indecent programming to the extent that state action must
be found.165 The court reasoned that "'[m]ere approval of or acquies-
cence in the initiatives of a private party' . . . 'cannot justify holding
the State responsible for those initiatives."' 166 The court also deter-
mined that leased and PEG access channels were not public forums
since they were not owned by the government. 167
The court, however, found that § 10(b)'s segregation and blocking
scheme constituted state action because it was the least restrictive
means of accommodating two competing interests: the interest in lim-
iting children's exposure to indecency and the interest in allowing
adults access to such material.1 68 The court found that voluntary use
of lockboxes was not an effective alternative to restricting a cable op-
erator's editorial discretion.169 Furthermore, because leased access
channels are not controlled by a single editor, the potential that chil-
dren would be inadvertently exposed to indecent material was great
since parents were responsible for continually activating and deacti-
vating their lockboxes. °70 The only other alternative to preventing
human error and inadvertent exposure to children was permanent in-
stallation of a lockbox and permanent loss of access to leased access
programming. 171 Thus, the court found that the regulation was consti-
tutional under a strict scrutiny analysis.1 72
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
By a seven to two vote, the Supreme Court found § 10(a) of the
1992 Cable Act constitutional, whereas §§ 10(b) and 10(c) were held
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 116-17
164. Id.
165. Id. at 117-19.
166. Id. at 118 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982)).
167. Id. at 122-23.
168. Id. at 123-29.
169. Id. at 125.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 123-25.
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unconstitutional by six to three and five to four votes respectively. 73
The following subparts discuss the various opinions of the Court. The
discussion is divided according to the three sections of the 1992 Cable
Act at issue in Denver Telecommunications Consortium.
1. Section 10(a)-Cable Operators' Regulation of Indecency on
Leased Access Channels Held Constitutional
Section 10(a) permitted cable operators to enforce a written, pub-
lished policy prohibiting programming that a cable operator believed
described or depicted sexual or excretory activities or organs in a pa-
tently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community
standards on leased access channels.1 74 Writing for the plurality on
this issue, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and
Souter, concluded that § 10(a) was consistent with the First Amend-
ment.175 Justices Stevens and Souter also wrote separate concur-
rences.176 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment. 77 Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, were the only dissenters. 178
a. Section 10(a)-Plurality Opinion
Because of the complex issues involved in balancing the rights of
the cable operator, the cable programmer, and the viewing public, as
well as the need to protect children from indecent material, Justice
Breyer departed from traditional First Amendment analysis in decid-
ing that § 10(a) is constitutional. 79 The plurality refused to apply a
traditional First Amendment analysis to leased access channels, rea-
soning there were no definitive analogies to print, broadcast, or com-
mon carrier cases that allowed it "to declare a rigid single standard,
good for now and for all future media and purposes. s180 The plurality,
unlike Justice Kennedy, refused to analyze this section under the pub-
lic forum doctrine. 81 Furthermore, because of the rapid changes tak-
173. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2380-81 (1996)
(plurality).
174. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
175. See Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2378.
176. Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2401 (Souter, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 2419 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
178. Id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
179. Id. at 2384-87.
180. Id. at 2385.
181. Id. at 2388-89. Public forums are public property of a limited or unlimited character that
the State opens up for expressive activity by part or all of the public. See International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). Public forums do not have to be
physical gathering places. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
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ing place in the law, as well as in the technological and industrial
structure of the telecommunication industry, the plurality felt it "un-
wise and unnecessary" to definitively pick one analogy or one specific
standard. 182
Using "close judicial scrutiny," the plurality found that § 10(a) ap-
propriately addressed the threat that indecency on leased access chan-
nels posed to children without imposing an "unnecessarily great
restriction" on free speech.183 The plurality advanced four reasons
why it found § 10(a) was a "sufficiently tailored response to an ex-
traordinarily important problem."'1 84 First, it reasoned that protecting
children is a compelling interest that the Court had often recog-
nized. 85 Second, the plurality reasoned that but for the 1984 Cable
Act, Congress would not have any control over a cable operator's
ability to regulate its own channels.' 8 6 Third, it analogized § 10(a) to
the "indecent" radio broadcast at issue in Pacifica.187 The plurality
reasoned that this choice to ban was permissible primarily because
"broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children," and the broadcast
media has "established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans.' 88 Fourth, the plurality reasoned that § 10(a)'s permis-
sive nature restricted speech less than the time, place, and manner
restriction in Pacifica.189 According to the plurality, the provision
does create a risk that a program will not appear; however, it reasoned
that risk is not the same as the certainty that accompanies a govern-
mental ban. 90 Section 10(a)'s permissive and flexible nature does not
830 (1995) (applying forum principles to "metaphysical" student activity funding system). Public
forums are not limited to property owned by the government. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473
U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (focusing forum analysis on access sought by speakers including physical
locations or non-physical communication systems).
182. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2385.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2385-86.
185. Id. at 2386. The Court has recognized that "protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors" is a compelling interest. Id. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)). It also reasoned that this interest
"extends to shielding minors from the influence of [indecent speech] that is not obscene by adult
standards." Id.
186. Id. at 2386.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (plurality)). Sixty-three
percent of American households subscribe to cable. Id. (citation omitted). On average, cable
households spend more of their day watching television than persons without cable service. Id.
(citation omitted). "Children spend more time watching television and view more channels than
do their parents, whether their household subscribes to cable or receives television over the air."
Id. (citation omitted).




require cable operators to ban broadcasts, but rather to rearrange
broadcast times to better fit the wants of adult audiences, while les-
sening the chances that children will gain access to harmful
material.19'
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment that § 10(a) is constitu-
tional. 192 He wrote separately to stress that the differences between
leased and PEG access channels are critical.193 He emphasized that
leased access channels are a creation of the government, while PEG
access channels are a product of contracts forged between cable oper-
ators and local cable franchising authorities. 94 As a result, PEG ac-
cess channels are subject to a variety of local content controls, apart
from federal controls, that leased access channels do not encounter. 195
Furthermore, Justice Stevens reasoned that returning control over in-
decent programming to cable operators pursuant to § 10(a) treats in-
dividual programmers no differently than programmers on any other
channel. 96 Returning control on leased, but not on PEG access chan-
nels, in his opinion, was not viewpoint discriminatory.' 97
Justice Souter also concurred in the judgment that § 10(a) is consti-
tutional. 198 He wrote separately to stress that the Court should not
use a categorical First Amendment analysis in this case. 199 He found
the technological and regulatory state of flux enveloping cable man-
dated against a rule-based analysis and favored a "protean" approach
in this case. 200
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, concurred in the judgment that § 10(a) is constitutional. 20' Jus-
tice Thomas reasoned that the cable medium is analogous to the print
medium and should be adjudicated under strict scrutiny.20 2 In his
opinion, after Turner Broadcasting, the Court made it clear that the
rights of the cable operator are paramount to the cable programmer
and viewers.203 Justice Thomas reasoned that viewers have a general
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2399-400.
195. Id. at 2399.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2401-03 (Souter, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 2401-02.
200. Id. at 2402.
201. Id. at 2419 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
202. Id. at 2421-22.
203. Id. at 2421 (discussing Turner Broadcasting's rejection of the Red Lion fairness doctrine).
1066 [Vol. 47:1041
INDECENT MATERIAL ON CABLE
right to see what a willing operator transmits, but under Tornillo20 4
and Pacific Gas,205 they do not have the right to force an unwilling
speaker to speak.20 6 Furthermore, in criticizing the plurality's "bal-
ancing" of the "complex interests" inherent in the constitutionality of
§ 10(a), Justice Thomas stated that a programmer ordinarily does not
have a protected right to transmit indecent programming, so transmis-
sion should not acquire constitutional significance on leased and PEG
access channels.20 7
b. Section 10(a)-Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found § 10(a) uncon-
stitutional. 20 8 Justice Kennedy strongly criticized the plurality opinion
for its departure from traditional First Amendment analysis.20 9 He
reasoned that even though the plurality would not apply strict scru-
tiny, they settled for synonyms.210 Justice Kennedy criticized the plu-
rality for treating public forums, broadcasters, and common carriers as
mere labels, rather than as categories with settled legal significance,
stating:211
Standards are the means by which we state in advance how to test a
law's validity, rather than letting the height of the bar be deter-
mined by the apparent exigencies of the day .... [Standards] also
provide notice and fair warning to those who must predict how the
courts will respond to attempts to suppress their speech.
212
Justice Kennedy reasoned that when there is a threat to free speech
in the context of emerging technology, a disciplined First Amendment
analysis should be applied.2 13 He found the novel case-by-case ap-
proach that the plurality used to be counterproductive.2 14 Addition-
ally, Justice Kennedy viewed § 10(a) as a straightforward First
Amendment issue of whether the government could deprive speakers
of protections afforded all others on the basis of the content of their
speech under a strict scrutiny analysis. 21 5 Reasoning that the govern-
204. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
206. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2421 (Thomas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
207. Id. at 2422.
208. Id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2406-07.
211. Id. at 2411-15.
212. Id. at 2406.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2405.
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ment may not "'reduce the adult population.., to [viewing] only what
is fit for children,"' Justice Kennedy held that the regulation did not
survive strict scrutiny.216
2. Section 10(b)-Segregation and Blocking Regulations on Leased
Access Channels Held Unconstitutional
Section 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act required cable operators to
segregate and block any patently offensive programming appearing on
leased access channels and to unblock it within thirty days of a sub-
scriber's written request to view it.217 A majority of the Court found
§ 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act unconstitutional. 218 The Court's analy-
sis of § 10(b) was the only part of the opinion to which a majority of
all the judges subscribed.2 19 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter,
Stevens, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, found § 10(b) to be un-
constitutional.220 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, dissented. 221
a. Section 10(b)-Majority Opinion
A majority of the Court found that § 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act
violated the First Amendment.2 22 In evaluating § 10(b), the Court ad-
hered to a traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis, even
though it did not use a similar analysis when adjudicating §§ 10(a) and
10(C). 223 While the Court found the need to protect children from
indecent programming compelling, it found that the segregation and
blocking requirements of § 10(b) were not the least restrictive means
by which to accomplish this goal.2 24 The Court found that
lockboxes, 22 5 v-chips,226 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996's
216. Id. at 2417 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 32 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
217. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
218. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2381, 2394.
219. Id. at 2394.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2419 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
222. Id. at 2394.
223. See supra Part tI.B.l.a; infra Part II.B.3.a.
224. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2392.
225. See supra text accompanying note 45.
226. V-chips are devices that will automatically be able to identify and block explicit or vio-
lent programs. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2392. In the future all manufactur-
ers will have to insert v-chips into televisions larger than thirteen inches. Telecommunications
Act of 1996 § 551(c), (e)(2), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 141-42 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
303(x)); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Second-Best Solution: The First Amendment, Broadcast
Indecency and the V-Chip, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1190, 1221 (1997).
[Vol. 47:10411068
INDECENT MATERIAL ON CABLE
scrambling provisions227 were less restrictive than the segregation and
blocking requirements of § 10(b). 228 Although the majority opinion
agreed with the government's arguments that v-chips and lockboxes
did not totally eliminate the problem of children gaining access to in-
decent material, it stated that "[n]o provision ... short of an absolute
ban, can offer certain protection against assault by a determined child.
We have not, however, generally allowed this fact alone to 'justify re-
ducing the adult population... to... only what is fit for children."' 229
In addition, the Court found the provision that required subscribers to
write to their cable operator thirty days in advance of wanting to re-
ceive indecent programming to be overly restrictive.230
b. Section 10(b)-Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, found § 10(b) constitutional. 231 Justice Thomas readily ac-
knowledged that § 10(b) was a content-based restriction on the trans-
mission of private speech which, thus, subjected it to a strict scrutiny
analysis.232 Under strict scrutiny, Justice Thomas found that § 10(b)
was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of protecting
children from indecent materials. 233 Justice Thomas reasoned that
lockboxes and v-chips depended too much on parental initiative. 234
With lockboxes and v-chips, parents must voluntarily purchase or
lease a lockbox, learn how to program it, and constantly be aware of
the times and stations on which indecent materials are shown.235
Although lockboxes and v-chips are arguably a less restrictive means
to block indecent material, Justice Thomas found the argument mean-
227. The majority pointed to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to show that § 10(b) was
not the least restrictive means to accomplish their goal. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S.
Ct. at 2392. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires cable operators to "scramble or...
block" such programming on any unleased channel "primarily dedicated to sexually oriented
programming." Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505(a), 47 U.S.C.A. § 561(a) (West Supp.
1997); Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2392. Cable operators are also required to
honor subscribers' requests to block any or all programs on any channel to which they do not
wish to subscribe. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.A. § 560(a).
228. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2392.
229. Id. at 2393 (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989); Bolger
v. Young's Drug Product Co., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)).
230. Id. at 2391.







ingless since those methods had proven ineffective in protecting chil-
dren's interests.2 36
Justice Thomas reasoned that segregation and blocking require-
ments were not intended to replace lockboxes and v-chips, but rather
§ 10(b) was a default setting by which a subscriber would not receive
blocked programming without a written request.2 37 The benefits of
the segregation and blocking requirements were twofold: subscribers
who did not want blocked programming were protected, and subscrib-
ers who did want indecent programming could request access. 238
Under § 10(b), a subscriber that requested access to blocked program-
ming remained free to use lockboxes and v-chips to regulate leased
access channels in the interest of their children.2 39 Thus, he reasoned
§ 10(b)'s segregation and blocking requirements work effectively in
conjunction with lockboxes and v-chips.240
3. Section 10(c)-Cable Operators' Regulation of Indecency on
PEG Access Channels Held Unconstitutional
Section 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act permitted cable operators to
decide whether to allow PEG access channels to carry programs that
they reasonably believe are patently offensive. 241 In a plurality opin-
ion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, found that
§ 10(c) violated the First Amendment.242 Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment.2 43 Justice Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented.244 Jus-
tice O'Connor authored a separate dissent.245
a. Section 10(c)-Plurality Opinion
Justice Breyer found that § 10(c) violated the First Amendment.
Justice Breyer differentiated § 10(c) from § 10(a) for four reasons. 246
First, cable operators historically have not exercised editorial control
over PEG access channels.2 47 Second, PEG access channel program-
ming is normally subject to complex supervisory systems comprised of
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2430.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2431.
241. See supra note 59.
242. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.
243. Id. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
244. Id. at 2426 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
245. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
246. Id. at 2397.
247. Id. at 2394.
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both public and private elements; therefore, "a cable operator's veto"
is less likely to be necessary to protect children from indecent pro-
gramming. 248 Third, the government did not show that there was a
significant enough problem of patently offensive broadcasts reaching
children on PEG access channels. 249 Fourth, a cable operator's veto
is more likely to result in erroneous exclusion of borderline programs
that should be broadcast on a system that encourages programming
that a community considers valuable. 250
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment that § 10(c) is unconsti-
tutional.251 He reasoned that PEG access channels are "designated
public forums" because they are property that the State has opened
up for expressive activity by part or all of the public.252 He supported
this premise by arguing that in return for granting cable operators
easements to use public rights-of-way for their cable lines, local gov-
ernments have bargained for a right to use cable lines for public ac-
cess.253 He reasoned that because § 10(c) vests the cable operators
with the power to override their franchise agreements, thereby under-
cutting the public forum agreement, § 10(c) must be given the most
"exacting scrutiny. ' 254 Justice Kennedy found that although protect-
ing children from indecent programming is a compelling interest,
§ 10(c) is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.2 55
b. Section 10(c)-Dissenting Opinions
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, disagreed with the plurality opinion for the same reasons that
he found § 10(a) to be constitutional. 256 Justice Thomas disagreed
with Justice Kennedy's analysis of PEG access channels as designated
public forums, reasoning that the Court has "never even hinted that
regulatory control, and particularly direct regulatory control, over a
private entity's First Amendment speech rights, could justify creation
of a pubic forum. '257 Justice Thomas also stated that there has never
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2395.
250. Id. at 2395-96.
251. Id. at 2404 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
252. Id. at 2409. For a detailed discussion of public forum analysis, see Daniel A. Farber &
John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219 (1984).




256. Id. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
257. Id. at 2427.
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been a public forum designation where a private entity had the "obli-
gation not only to permit another to speak, but to actually help pro-
duce and then transmit the message on that person's behalf. 2' 58
Justice Thomas argued vehemently that cable operators are private
entities and should be adjudicated under the same principles as news-
paper and bookstore owners.259 He reasoned that a cable operator's
editorial rights are stronger than a programmer's right to transmit and
a viewer's right to watch.2 60 Furthermore, Justice Thomas found
§ 10(c) constitutional because the cable access provisions, as they
stand, expand rather than prohibit the free speech opportunities of
programmers who have no underlying constitutional right to speak
through the cable medium. 261 According to Justice Thomas, § 10(c)
merely restored to cable operators a small portion of the editorial dis-
cretion taken away by the 1984 Cable Act.262
Justice O'Connor also dissented, finding § 10(c) constitutional. 263
She did not find validity in the purported differences that the plurality
used to strike down § 10(c) while upholding § 10(a). 264 In her dissent,
she emphasized that the permissive nature of §§ 10(a) and 10(c)
neither encouraged nor discouraged cable operators from banning in-
decent materials on their stations.265 Like § 10(a), § 10(c) did not bur-
den a programmer's right to seek access to indecent programming on
cable. 266 Rather the provisions merely restored part of the operator's
editorial discretion without burdening the programmer's underlying
speech rights.267
III. ANALYSIS
This Part begins by discussing the Court's selective application of
strict scrutiny to only one of the three 1992 Cable Act provisions at
issue in Denver Telecommunications Consortium. Next, the proffered
rationales for upholding § 10(a) as constitutional while striking down
§ 10(c) as unconstitutional are found to be disingenuous and analyti-
cally unsupported. This Part then proceeds to discuss why the techno-
logical advancements in the cable industry make it analytically similar
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2421.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2425-26.
262. Id. at 2422-23.
263. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2403-04.
266. Id. at 2404.
267. Id. at 2403.
1072 [Vol. 47:1041
INDECENT MATERIAL ON CABLE
to the print medium, make it analytically distinct from the broadcast
medium, and justify its analysis under strict scrutiny. Lastly, an argu-
ment is set forth demonstrating that § 10(b) survives strict scrutiny
because it is the most effective, and therefore the most narrowly tai-
lored means to achieve the compelling interest of protecting children
from indecent cable programming.
A. Selective Use of Strict Scrutiny from Conflicting Vantage Points
Denver Telecommunications Consortium poses unique challenges
for the Court because it concerns the 1992 Cable Act, which returns to
cable operators the right to regulate indecency on their stations, a
right which the 1984 Cable Act eliminated.268 Prior to the 1984 Cable
Act, absent specific franchise agreements to the contrary, cable opera-
tors could choose not to air programming at their discretion, be it for
financial, personal, or humanistic reasons. 269 In its opinion, the Court
struggled to decide whether to apply strict scrutiny, intermediate scru-
tiny, or the ambiguous Pacifica standard to this case and to determine
whose rights were paramount-cable operators', cable programmers',
or viewers'.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas argued
that the Court should analyze this case under strict scrutiny from the
vantage point of cable operators' rights being paramount to cable pro-
grammers' and viewers' rights.270 Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy
likewise wanted this case analyzed under strict scrutiny, but with the
rights of the programmer, and, derivatively the viewer, being para-
mount to the rights of the cable operator.271 The plurality attempted
to make analogies to the print, telephone, and broadcast media to find
a standard of review appropriate to the cable industry.272 Thrown into
this mix was the compelling interest of protecting children from inde-
cent programming.2 73 Instead of deciding on a scrutiny level, the plu-
rality used a case-by-case approach to adjudicate §§ 10(a) and
268. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
269. See supra Part I.A.2.
270. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2421-23 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissent-
ing); see supra text accompanying notes 201-07, 256-62.
271. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2410 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Cable operators serve as conduits for the speech of other people. Id.; cf PruneYard Shop-
ping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (requiring a shopping center owner to act as a conduit
for solicitors on the owner's property).
272. See supra Part I.B.1-3.
273. See Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct at 2391; Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thorn-
burgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1541 (2d Cir. 1991).
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10(C). 274  However, the Court did use strict scrutiny to analyze
§ 10(b).2 75
B. The Plurality's Four Flawed Reasons for Upholding § 10(a)
In its analysis, the plurality advanced four reasons for holding
§ 10(a) constitutional-all of which are based on conclusory state-
ments and manipulation of prior precedents and terminology. First,
the plurality reasoned that § 10(a) comes accompanied with the ex-
tremely important child-protection justification that the Court has
often found compelling. 276 Granted, protecting children from expo-
sure to indecent materials is indisputably a compelling state interest;
however, the Court has most often used such language when analyzing
a First Amendment issue under strict scrutiny. 277 A compelling inter-
est, standing on its own, is never significant enough to justify a regula-
tion.278 Moreover, the plurality conveniently failed to identify any
narrowly tailored means which might accompany this compelling
interest.
Second, the plurality reasoned that § 10(a) arises in a very particu-
lar context, in that, but for a previous act of Congress (the 1984 Cable
Act), cable operators would not need congressional permission to reg-
ulate indecency on their stations. 279 The plurality then proceeded to
state that because this Act involves complex First Amendment issues,
the rights of the cable operator must be balanced against the rights of
the cable programmer and, derivatively, the viewer.280 However,
prior to the 1984 Cable Act no balancing was required, and the plural-
ity never explained why returning to the status quo mandates a bal-
ancing test. Furthermore, the plurality did not address why a
programmer's right to show or a viewer's right to watch indecent ma-
terial must be balanced against a cable operator's editorial rights
274. See supra text accompanying notes 183-91; supra Part II.B.3.a.; see generally Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997) (discussing
the terminology of rational, intermediate, and strict scrutiny).
275. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
276. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2391; see supra text accompanying note 185.
277. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (using strict scrutiny to
prohibit obscene, but not indecent, telephone messages); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (using strict scrutiny to strike down the Commission's demand order-
ing the utility to place a third party's newsletter in its billing envelopes); Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (using strict scrutiny to strike down a statute which required
newspapers that attacked a political candidate's character to afford free space to the candidate to
reply).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
279. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
280. Id.
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when a newspaper editor, a bookstore owner, or a movie theater
owner is not held to a similar balancing standard.2 81 By even requir-
ing a balancing test, the plurality, in effect, holds that the rights of the
viewer and programmer have constitutional significance over the
rights of the cable operator.2 82 This was done despite the Court's pre-
vious admonishments that "[i]n the realm of private speech or expres-
sion, government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another. "283
Third, the plurality reasoned that the constitutionality of § 10(a) is
analogous to the balance the plurality struck with the indecent radio
broadcasts at issue in Pacifica.284 Although § 10(a) and Pacifica both
concern indecency, this is about as far as the comparison goes.285 The
plurality in Pacifica focused much of its attention on statutory inter-
pretation, the constitutional significance of indecency, and a nuisance
rationale for banning the indecent programming during specific peri-
ods of the day.2 86 None of the aforementioned were focused on in the
plurality's analysis of § 10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act.
Fourth, the plurality reasoned that § 10(a)'s permissive nature re-
stricts "less than, not more than, the ban at issue in Pacifica. 287
While this is true, the comparison to Pacifica is not well formulated
because Pacifica dealt with a regulation that banned the broadcasting
of indecent materials during specific times of the day, whereas § 10(a)
restores cable operators' editorial control. In addition, § 10(a) of the
1992 Cable Act involves cable, a medium that a plurality has recog-
nized as significantly different from the broadcast medium, due in
281. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 19-28 (1965) (advocating against legislation that restricts anyone's freedom to
speak). But see Lee C. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438 (1983)
(taking the opposite position).
282. See Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2421 (Thomas, J., concurring and
dissenting).
283. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (citing Mem-
bers of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). The essence of the
protection that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press," U.S. CONST. amend. I, is that Congress may not regulate speech except in cases of ex-
traordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we have not elsewhere required.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-20 (1989); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 639 (1943); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
284. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
285. See Lee, supra note 38, at 50 (arguing that any medium can appear similar to broadcast-
ing-for example fuel shortages can lead to government allocation of fuel used to power news-
paper delivery trucks).
286. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-48, 750-51 (1978) (plurality).
287. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2387.
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large part to the inapplicability of the spectrum scarcity rationale in
the cable context.288
Thus, all four of the reasons advanced by the plurality for upholding
§ 10(a) are easily disputed. The reasons advanced are mainly an at-
tempt to support a desired result without using traditional First
Amendment analysis as discussed below. This departure from tradi-
tional analysis is necessary to selectively uphold § 10(a) as constitu-
tional while striking down its sister provision, § 10(c), as
unconstitutional.
C. The Plurality's Inconsistent Differentiation Between
§§ 10(a) and 10(c)
Although the plurality found § 10(a) of the 1992 Act constitutional,
the plurality ironically found § 10(c) unconstitutional. 289 The plurality
advanced four unconvincing arguments for treating § 10(c) differently
from § 10(a). First, it reasoned that the historical background of
§ 10(a)'s leased access channels differs from § 10(c)'s PEG access
channels. 290 However, the fact that leased access channels were the
product of the federal government, whereas PEG access channels ini-
tially arose out of the cable franchises awarded by municipalities, does
not weaken cable operators' editorial rights.291 In upholding § 10(a)
by reasoning that it cannot give back editorial rights that cable opera-
tors never previously exercised, "[t]he plurality ... mistakes inability
to exercise a right for [the] absence of the right altogether. '292
Second, the plurality differentiates § 10(c) from § 10(a) by reason-
ing that programming on PEG access channels is "normally subject to
complex supervisory systems of various sorts, often with both public
and private elements. '293 However, the interest in protecting children
from indecent programming is the same irrespective of the supervi-
sory scheme. A local municipality's supervisory scheme does not jus-
tify treating § 10(c) as unconstitutional and § 10(a) as
constitutional.294 Furthermore, if the supervisory systems are as strin-
gent as the plurality contended, returning editorial discretion to cable
288. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994). Cable is not subject to the
physical limitations that affect the broadcast industry. Id.; see FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (striking down a statute which prohibited certain noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasting stations from editorializing because it violated the First Amendment).
289. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2390, 2397.
290. Id. at 2394.
291. Id. at 2403-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
292. Id. at 2425 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
293. Id. at 2394.
294. Id. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
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operators should not result in censorship, since the municipality will
already have blocked the indecent programming. Restoring this dis-
cretion would only serve as a secondary, precautionary measure cut-
ting in favor of protecting children from patently offensive
programming. 295
Third, the plurality differentiated § 10(c) from § 10(a) because it
reasoned that returning cable operators' editorial discretion on PEG
access channels is more likely to exclude "borderline programs" that
should be shown than to protect children from indecent program-
ming. 296 However, this statement is conclusory, and appellants of-
fered no statistical support and no analogous comparison.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a cable operator will exclude program-
ming for which there is a market demand, regardless of whether it is
indecent. 297 The plurality never explained why indecent programming
receives greater constitutional endorsement on PEG access channels
than it does on other cable access and broadcast television channels.
Fourth, the plurality differentiated § 10(c) from § 10(a) because it
reasoned that unlike leased channels, the government had not shown
that there was a significant nationwide problem of indecent program-
ming reaching children on PEG access channels that justified the reg-
ulation.298 However, the plurality did not explain how significant the
problem must be before a cable operator should be allowed to reas-
sert its editorial discretion. Ironically, in Pacifica, a case to which the
plurality in Denver Telecommunications Consortium made many
broad analogies, the plurality in effect held that just one exposure to
indecent programming was too much.299 Given that Pacifica solely in-
volved an auditory broadcast, whereas cable indecency has both an
auditory and visual impact on children, this line of reasoning typifies
the inconsistencies running throughout the plurality's opinion in Den-
ver Telecommunications Consortium.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 225-28 (discussing the constitutionality of the
scrambling and v-chip requirements of the Telecommunications Act of .1996); see also Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 790 (D. Del. 1996) (refusing to
enjoin the enforcement of the Telecommunications Act of 1996's scrambling provisions).
296. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2395.
297. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1416. The House Committee reported that the 1984 Cable Act
acknowledged that market demand would lead cable operators to provide diverse programming
to maximize subscription demands. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 48 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4685.
298. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
299. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (plurality).
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D. The Plurality's Reluctance to Use a Traditional First Amendment
Analysis for §§ 10(a) and 10(c)
In adjudicating §§ 10(a) and 10(c), the plurality elected not to use
traditional First Amendment standards.300 It felt that it was "unwise
and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of
words" with which to analyze this case. 301 The plurality did not apply
"strict scrutiny," yet it used terminology that alluded to strict scru-
tiny.302 It used close judicial scrutiny303 and "extremely important
problem" 30 4 or "extraordinary problem"30 5 for a compelling interest.
The plurality explained: "The admonition that the restriction not be
unnecessarily great in light of the interest it serves is substituted for
the usual narrow tailoring requirements [of strict scrutiny]. "306
In its avoidance of traditional First Amendment analysis, the plural-
ity focused on the unique and changing attributes of the cable indus-
try.30 7 However, the plurality failed to see that as the cable industry
technologically advances and is able to increase the number of chan-
nels available to viewers, it becomes less like broadcasting and more
like the print medium. 308 In Justice Thomas's dissent, he stated this
point briefly in a footnote:
Curiously, the plurality relies on "changes taking place in the law,
the technology, and the industrial structure, relating to telecommu-
nications," to justify its avoidance of traditional First Amendment
standards. If anything, as the plurality recognizes, those recent de-
velopments-which include the growth of satellite broadcast pro-
gramming and the coming influx of video dialtone services-suggest
that local cable operators have little or no monopoly power and cre-
ate no programming bottleneck problems, thus effectively negating
the primary justifications for treating cable operators differently
from other First Amendment speakers. 309
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that because of "the rapid
advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology, soon
there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who
300. See supra text accompanying notes 183-91, 246-50.
301. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2385. The Court has consistently modified
the "traditional" First Amendment analysis according to specific needs and problems. Id. at
2384-85.
302. Id. at 2406 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
303. Id. at 2385 (plurality); id. at 2406 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
304. See supra note 303.
305. See supra note 303.
306. Id. at 2406-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
307. Id. at 2402 (Souter, J., concurring).
308. See Lee, supra note 38, at 590 (discussing the "dynamic" nature of cable technology).
309. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2422 n.3 (citations omitted).
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may use the cable medium. ' 310 The Court has also acknowledged that
cable is not inhibited by the scarcity of frequency rationale that for-
merly justified applying a lower level of scrutiny to the broadcast me-
dium.311 Cable may look like and feel like broadcast television
because it is seen on the same television screen; however, its techno-
logical composition makes it a very distinct beast.
E. Cable Shares First Amendment Commonalties with the
Print Medium
Although cable neither looks like nor possesses technological simi-
larities to the print medium, nonetheless, in terms of First Amend-
ment analysis, cable shares many commonalties with it.312 The
proliferation and increased ease of entry into cable markets weighs
heavily in favor of adjudicating First Amendment issues in the cable
arena under strict scrutiny, similar to the print medium.313 In Turner
Broadcasting, the Court stated that the spectrum scarcity "rationale
for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to
broadcast regulation ... does not apply in the context of cable regula-
tion."314 "[U]nlike broadcasting, which requires limitations on the
number of channel allocations to eliminate the problem of interfer-
ence, cable technology does not require government regulation to pre-
vent interference among cable channels and the technology has the
potential for tremendous channel capacity. '315 The non-spectrum-
310. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994). Paul Kagain Associates, Inc.
predicted the increased number of cable channels available to the average television household
over a six year period: 59 channels in 1996; 69 in 1997; 80 in 1998; 93 in 1999; 111 in 2000; 135 in
2001; and 157 in 2002. Turner Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 746 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Gray,
supra note 23, at 1030 (stating that as competition increases in the cable industry, "cable opera-
tors will no longer have 'gatekeeper' control over the households they serve, and the intellectual
underpinnings of the Court's [scarcity rationale] will collapse").
311. Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 401, 442-43 (1989).
312. See Lee, supra note 38, at 583-89 (discussing the similarities between the cable and print
media). But see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78
(10th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing cable from the print medium based on public domain principles).
313. See Lee, supra note 38, at 588-91 (arguing that although cable is not "exactly" like the
newspaper medium, it is sufficiently unlike broadcasting that cable operators should not be af-
forded the same "editorial freedom" granted broadcasters).
314. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994); see Robert Corn-Revere, New
Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 247, 264-282 (1994) (providing a historical overview of the regulation of new
technologies).
315. Lee, supra note 38, at 580 (citations omitted); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that electrical equipment controls interference among speak-
ers on a single cable by dividing the cable into channels). The Court has also observed that
technological advances may have rendered the scarcity rationale obsolete for cable television
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based aspect of cable allows for a potentially limitless number of view-
ing and listening options.316
Critics of holding the cable medium to the same judicial standard as
the print medium argue that the economic barriers to entry in the
cable industry render it incomparable to the print medium.317 This
belief, however, is unfounded because the economic barriers to entry
into the cable market are not any greater than those encountered in
establishing multimillion dollar printing and distribution facilities.318
Additionally, critics argue that unlike the cable medium, the print me-
dium still allows for inexpensive distribution of printed materials and
thus the economic barriers for entry are not as great.319 This effort to
define the print medium as encompassing all forms of distribution,
while ignoring the "multiplicity of video distribution mechanisms
when defining cable as a distinct medium ' 320 is nonsensical.
In addition, just as readers' needs and requests for certain publica-
tions are satisfied by market forces, so too will be cable viewers' needs
and requests. 321 As seen in WNCN, the public interest is best served
by promoting diversity in entertainment through market forces and
competition among communication channels. 322 Because of techno-
logical and economic advancements, as well as the proliferation of me-
dia sources, there is little support for giving viewers of indecent
programming superior rights to cable operators and market de-
mand.323 If there is a great demand for indecent materials in a certain
community, it is more likely than not that operators will allow pro-
grammers to broadcast such material because it is in their best eco-
even though it arguably still applies to broadcast television. See Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 638;
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.ll (1984).
316. Lee, supra note 38, at 580.
317. Id. at 587-89.
318. See Emord, supra note 311, at 440-41 & n.235.
[Sitarting a large market television station is one-seventh as expensive as starting a
250,000 circulation daily newspaper; starting a medium market television station is al-
most one-fourth as expensive as starting a 65,000 circulation daily newspaper; and start-
ing a small market television station is almost one-half as expensive as starting a 20,000
circulation daily newspaper.
Id. at 441 n.235 (citation ommitted).
319. See Lee, supra note 38, at 588-90.
320. Id. at 589.
321. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 600 (1981).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
323. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1471-72. Chen argues that the "regulation of mass communi-
cations serves no purpose except to protect incumbents on the verge of technological and eco-
nomic extinction." Id. He predicts that as technology advances, the cable industry will become a
regulatory ward just as the must-carry provisions of the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts made broad-
cast television a regulatory ward. Id. at 1472.
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nomic interest. 324 Many cable networks broadcast indecent materials
on pay channels, such as SPICE and the Playboy Channel. This would
satisfy whatever demand for indecent materials a cable operator
chooses not to provide on its leased and PEG access channels, just as
"fringe magazines" or leaflets satisfy excess demand that newspaper
editors choose not to print in its newspaper. 325
Given the similarities of the cable medium to the print medium, the
permissive nature of §§ 10(a) and 10(c), and the compelling interest of
protecting children from indecent programming, returning cable oper-
ators' rights not to show indecent programming is a minor concession.
Sections 10 (a) and 10(c) do not require that cable operators ban all or
any indecent programming, rather they merely return cable operators'
editorial discretion. On a micro-level, in terms of an individual cable
operator's total programming, this might have minimal effects. How-
ever, on a macro-level, the First Amendment freedoms at issue and
the protection of children are of enormous magnitude.
F. The Majority's Selective Use of Strict Scrutiny in Adjudicating
§ 1O(b)
Ironically, even though the plurality did not have a problem depart-
ing from traditional First Amendment analysis in adjudicating
§§ 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act, a majority of the Court was
quick to analyze § 10(b) under a traditional strict scrutiny test and
found it unconstitutional. 326 Why the Court used First Amendment
terminology and precedents to adjudicate § 10(b) and not §§ 10(a)
and 10(c) is unexplained and puzzling.32 7 Why the Court did not use
the intermediate scrutiny test that it applied in Turner Broadcasting328
and Time Warner Entertainment Co. 329 for cable, is likewise puzzling.
Furthermore, throughout its entire analysis, the plurality compared
Denver Telecommunications Consortium to Pacifica to reach its con-
clusions that § 10(a) is constitutional and § 10(c) is unconstitu-
tional.330 However, the Court conveniently did not look to Pacifica
324. See WNCN, 450 U.S. at 600.
325. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2421 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Emord, supra note 311, at 448-50 (discussing
commonalities between cable and the traditional printed press).
326. Denver Telecomm. Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2391-92, 2394.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 183-89, 246-50; supra Part II.B.2.a.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 141-52.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 187-91.
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for guidance in adjudicating § 10(b). 331 In Pacifica, the plurality up-
held a complete ban on indecency during specific times of the day,332
whereas in Denver Telecommunications Consortium, the plurality
struck down § 10(b) which was much less restrictive on viewers' and
programmers' rights.333 Unlike Pacifica, § 10(b) still permitted view-
ers access to indecent materials at all times of the day.334 Section
10(b) only required that viewers follow written procedures to unblock
programming from their televisions.335 After these procedures were
followed, a viewer then had unlimited access to indecent program-
ming on leased access channels. 336 In addition, once unlimited access
was obtained, viewers could still use lockboxes to block programming.
Section 10(b)'s segregate and block provisions were not an all or noth-
ing alternative. Rather they effectively accommodated three compet-
ing interests: (1) viewers who wanted to watch indecent programming;
(2) programmers who wanted to show indecent programming; and (3)
parents who wanted to protect their children from indecent
programming. 337
In adjudicating § 10(b)'s segregate and block provisions, the
Supreme Court would have been prudent to take note of the Second
and Ninth Circuits' analyses of reverse blocking provisions in Dial In-
formation Services Corp. v. Thornburgh and Information Providers'
Coalition v. FCC respectively. 338 Using a strict scrutiny analysis, both
courts found that reverse blocking provisions were narrowly tailored
to meet the compelling interest of reducing children's access to inde-
cent communication, despite the existence of less restrictive means of
limiting access such as credit cards, access codes, and scrambling.339
The courts reasoned that the aforementioned blocking mechanisms
"would not even come close" to alleviating the problem of children
gaining access to indecent phone messages. 340 Similar to inadequacies
of lockboxes and v-chips in the cable arena, these alternative dial-a-
331. Denver Telecomm. Consortium 116 S. Ct. at 2391 ("Nor need we here determine
whether, or the extent to which, Pacifica does, or does not, impose some lesser standard of
review where indecent speech is at issue .... ); see also Wasserman, supra note 226, at 1202
(referring to Pacifia as an anomaly).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 123-33.
333. See supra text accompanying note 58.
334. See supra text accompanying note 58.
335. See supra text accompanying note 58.
336. See supra text accompanying note 58.
337. See Brief for Respondents at 27, Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 96-1169).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92, 99-101.
340. See Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1542 (2d. Cir. 1991) (arguing
that the court should focus on the "goals as well as [the] means"); Information Providers' Coali-
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porn blocking mechanisms failed to be effective because they relied
too much on parental initiative to be aware of dial-a-porn availability
and the available blocking mechanisms. 341
Additionally, in Turner Broadcasting, the United States District
Court of Columbia held that must-carry regulations are narrowly tai-
lored. The court stated:
While the "[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a
manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not
serve to advance its goals," a regulation under the intermediate
standard of scrutiny "will not be invalid simply because a court con-
cludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by
some less-speech-restrictive alternative." The narrow tailoring stan-
dard is satisfied "'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substan-
tial government interest that would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation."' Under this standard, "the government is
not required to settle for means that serve its interests less effec-
tively merely because an alternative might be less burdensome." 342
Paradoxically, the Turner Broadcasting court held that under interme-
diate scrutiny a less restrictive regulation is inadequate if it does not
achieve its goal, whereas, in Denver Telecommunications Consortium,
under a strict scrutiny test, the Court held that § 10(b) was too restric-
tive, even though it was the most effective means to achieve its goal.34 3
Lockboxes and v-chips might be less restrictive than § 10(b)'s segre-
gate and block regulations; however, they have not proven to be the
most effective way to limit children's access to indecent program-
ming.34 4 It is ironic that the Court upheld restrictions it found to be
narrowly drawn when applied to dial-a-porn, which requires affirma-
tive action by children, and yet struck down analogous restrictions on
leased access channels, which confront passive and unaware children
in the privacy of their homes. 345 Furthermore, it is illogical under
strict scrutiny in Denver Telecommunications Consortium that the nar-
row tailoring requirement was not satisfied even though it was the
most effective means to achieve its goal, whereas under intermediate
scrutiny in Turner Broadcasting the narrowly tailoring requirement
was satisfied despite the existence of less effective means to achieve its
tion v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing flaws in a blocking proposal for dial-a-
porn services).
341. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d at 1541-43.
342. Turner Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 747 (D.D.C. 1995) (citations omitted).
343. See Wasserman, supra note 226, at 1208 (finding the restrictions that the Denver Telecom-
munications Consortium Court struck down were more permissive than the ban upheld in Act
111).
344. See Brief for Respondents at 22, Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 96-1169).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101; supra Part II.B.2.a.
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goal. Intermediate scrutiny is supposed to be a lesser standard of
review.
The Court's holding that § 10(b) is unconstitutional is especially
egregious since § 10(b)'s purpose was to segregate and block pro-
gramming harmful to children's well-being and developmental
growth, the protection of which is a compelling interest.346 Indecent
programming has consisted of "graphic depictions of intercourse, mas-
turbation, anal and oral sex, and advertising of phone sex lines and
escort services. '347 In Ginsberg v. State of New York,348 the Court
stated:
Different factors come into play ... where the interest at stake is
the effect of erotic expression upon children. The world of children
is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor
of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different
rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant
to freedom of expression for children, it suffices to say that regula-
tions of communication addressed to them need not conform to the
requirements of the [F]irst [A]mendment in the same ways as those
applicable to adults. 349
By striking § 10(b), the Court has put an enormous weight on parents
to be informed, to purchase, and to learn to use lockboxes if they want
to shield their children from indecent materials.350 This weight is espe-
cially great on single parents who often lack the time and resources
available in two-parent households. Furthermore, children at the
greatest risk of exposure to indecent programming are most likely to
have parents who will fail to take the proactive steps necessary to
shield them from indecent programming on leased access channels.
346. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct 2374, 2391 (1996)
(plurality); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1992); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 639-40 (1968).
347. See United States Amicus Brief, at *3, n.2, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality) (Nos. 95-124, 95-227), 1996 WL 34130. "[O]ne of
Time Warner's southern Manhattan cable system's channels-35-has been home to a substan-
tial amount of sexually explicit programming." Id. at *2.
348. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court upheld a criminal obscenity statute which prohibited the
sale of magazines containing statements of sexual conduct and excitement to minors under 17
years of age. Id. at 636-37.
349. Id. at 638 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963)).
350. See Brief for Respondents at 24, Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 96-1169); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (rea-
soning that the custody, care and nurturing of a child resides first with the parents); Wasserman,
supra note 226, at 1214-15 (discussing parental control over children's viewing of indecency on
cable and broadcast television).
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IV. IMPACT
The Court's case-by-case analysis leaves little precedent by which to
adjudicate future First Amendment challenges in the cable arena.
This creates a precarious situation since the technological changes af-
fecting cable television are not occurring in a vacuum.351 The Court's
holding and analysis have ramifications on cyberspace,35 2 high pow-
ered direct broadcast satellite service, wireless two-way data transmis-
sion, and telephone companies' development of video and data
networks both independently and with cable partners.35 3 Courts and
legislatures will face the difficult task of developing guidelines and
rules based on the assumption that cable requires an analysis distinct
and separate from traditional First Amendment analysis.3 54 Lower
courts and the Supreme Court itself will have great difficulty in apply-
ing the obtuse rule that came out of Denver Telecommunications Con-
sortium. One can only speculate whether the Court will use the
intermediate scrutiny test of Turner Broadcasting355 and Time Warner
Entertainment Co.356 or whether it will address First Amendment is-
sues in technologically advancing industries with reference to ambigu-
ous and undefined terms such as "close judicial scrutiny," 357
"extremely important problem" 358 and "extraordinary problem" 359
that it used in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
In Denver Telecommunications Consortium, the plurality neither re-
lied on previous precedents and established levels of review, nor did it
create new precedents that can be applied to future cases. Instead,
the plurality decided the outcome of the case and then applied prece-
dent, statutes, and FCC regulations selectively to meet its agenda.
351. See Corn-Revere, supra note 314, at 263.
352. See Michael Johns, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old Doctrines
New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1383, 1383-86 (1995-96) (discussing First Amendment freedoms
in cyberspace).
353. See Corn-Revere, supra note 314, at 263; see also Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Car-
riage: Approaches to Analyzing the First Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1071, 1075-80 (1992) (discussing inter alia telephone and cable cross ownership rights).
354. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2402 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring); see also Andrew C. Barnett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of
Telecommunications in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 40-48 (1993-94) (discussing the
government as regulator and lawmaker).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 141-52.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
357. See supra notes 183, 303 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 184, 305 and accompanying text.
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This is apparent in the plurality's nebulous differentiation between the
constitutionality of §§ 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act, its incon-
sistent analogies to the broadcast industry, and its manipulation of
traditional First Amendment terminologies. Moreover, the Court's
willingness to use a traditional, strict scrutiny First Amendment analy-
sis for § 10(b) and not for §§ 10(a) and 10(c) underscores the duplicity
of this decision.
The plurality's ad-hoc gathering and manipulation of rules in this
case leaves cable in a doctrinal wasteland. The use of stringent stan-
dards in certain contexts and less stringent standards in other contexts
undercuts judicial integrity. The plurality justified its reluctance to ap-
ply a traditional First Amendment test because of the rapid and tech-
nological changes occurring in the cable industry. However, it seems
the plurality missed the forest for the trees, since the proliferation and
ease of entry into the cable market makes it most comparable to the
print medium. Under the print medium's strict scrutiny test, the plu-
rality would not have to do a balancing act among the cable operator,
the cable programmer, and the viewer, because the rights of the cable
operator, like a newspaper publisher would be paramount. Conse-
quently, §§ 10(b) and 10(c), and not just § 10(a), of the 1992 Cable
Act would be constitutional under the First Amendment.
If the plurality is reluctant to set a standard for cable because of its
concern about technology's direction, should it not begin by ex-
panding cable operators' rights to speech rather than suppressing
them? After all, speech also carries with it the right not to say
anything!
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